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C.D. HERRERA

UNIVERSAL COMPULSORY SERVICE IN MEDICAL RESEARCH

ABSTRACT. Despite the prominence of healthcare-related concerns in public debate,
the ground remains infertile for the idea of conscripting citizens into medical research.
Reluctance to entertain the thought of a system where nearly everyone could be selected
for service might reflect uncertainty about what the project would involve. There might
also be a fear that the more crucial issue is how to protect research subjects within current,
voluntary systems. No doubt reluctance to explore a system of universal service results
from the common hope that each of us might avoid research in any capacity besides
researcher. A system of full civic participation might, however, avoid many of the usual
objections. Ethics regulations, including informed-consent guidelines, could for the most
part remain in force. Though the system would compel people to serve, it could remain
responsive to principles of autonomy and justice if it centered on broad public education,
community representation, and a lottery-type selection process. The system could draw
from the largest possible cross-section of society, and offer conscripts the widest possible
range of service. In this way, a compulsory system might reconcile the expectations about
healthcare with research needs.
KEY WORDS: clinical research, ethics, justice, public health

THE RESEARCH LOTTERY
Despite the prominence of healthcare concerns in the public forum, there
is surprisingly little discussion of universal service in medical research.
I have in mind a system where all citizens would be obliged to serve in
research. The ground is not very fertile for proposals like this, probably
because of uncertainty about what goals a universal system would have.
There are also legitimate, thorny questions about how the system would
replace or coexist with current systems which involve nothing close to
universal participation. Commentators in medicine and bioethics, for their
part, have traditionally thought that the more critical issue is how to protect
the research subjects who participate in voluntary systems.1 That those
subjects are not always treated very well probably makes a system where
nearly everyone would have some involvement in research look that much
less appealing. Reluctance to ponder universal service could also result
from a variety of beliefs about research, one of these being the hope that
each of us might avoid participating in any capacity besides researcher.
In the face of this, an argument for universal research service can I think
Theoretical Medicine 24: 215–231, 2003.
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still respond to the usual objections by stressing the need for education,
community representation, and a lottery-type selection process.
THE PERCEIVED SEPARATION BETWEEN RESEARCH AND
THERAPY
As medical research is designed to satisfy a number of private and public
needs, it stands to reason that a system of universal research participation
would have several goals. One of the most important would be to improve
education about the day-to-day workings of healthcare. This education
would be largely informal. No one would be sent to school or forced
to learn about the system, though students in school might learn about
the system in the same way that they currently learn about voting, local
government, and other aspects of civic life. The “education” might better
be termed “public awareness” of the kind that comes through greater
involvement and contact with the system of healthcare research. Just as the
local governments inform people of public works or voting procedures,
representatives of the healthcare-research system might provide information geared to the questions that people would have about universal
service. Citizens might receive brochures in the mail, for example, or the
media might provide announcements and resources for those interested
in additional information on the system. A promising idea would be to
have citizens able to fulfill their service duty by assisting in educational
programs or efforts.
Having said this, I am more interested in the need for the enhanced
public awareness than in debating at this stage how it might come about.
In conversation and the literature people sometimes talk as if researchers
and subjects form a partnership that has only tangential connections to
society, and that for the most part, remains invisible. The progress of
medical knowledge is a popular topic. Yet people, including those who
work in bioethics or medicine, sometimes discuss progress as if researcher
and subject can discreetly step outside of society, conduct their mysterious business, and then return with knowledge that the rest of us can use.
As we wait, we generally ask only that the conduct within this hidden
collaboration be ethical.
The belief in this kind of separation likely reflects equal parts ignorance
and wishful thinking. It might be more comfortable to imagine that medical
research is far removed from the interests of the average healthy person.
This image would allow us to sit next to a research subject in the same
clinic waiting room, strangely at home with the thought that the therapy we
go there to receive is unaffected by what goes on in research. The patient
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who suffers an occasional headache or sore throat might typically feel no
linkage, moral or otherwise, to clinical trials and research in general. The
typical patient, I gather, feels still less connection to the ongoing struggle
against an epidemic like HIV. We distance ourselves morally from what
research calls for, and the sacrifices that subjects and others make.2 The
perceived separation might also explain how it is that we can encourage
researchers to eradicate something like HIV while we insist that HIVpositive patients have the only direct interest in medical research related
to that effort.
These ways of thinking represent a challenge for any healthcare system,
and thinking like this can undermine efforts to promote a universal system
to be sure. That is because universal systems are sustained by a shared
sense of obligation, a joining of community and individual interests. The
challenge is to overcome the thought that the obligations to improve
medical care exist solely between researchers and the HIV-infected, for
instance. Or, to take another example, so long as I don’t have Alzheimer’s
disease, why should I be called upon to help study and treat it? The
convenient answer is that under traditional healthcare systems, I am not
expected to. Should I become afflicted with Alzheimer’s, I will merely take
advantage of those who are now working on the cure. The sharp distinction
that we make between the development and testing of medical treatment
and its actual delivery supports the misplaced idea that serving in research
is either supererogatory or an act of desperation.
People who regard research this way underestimate the social or public
aspects of medicine and medical knowledge. “What does it mean,” one
writer asks, “to say that medical knowledge is a social product? It is to say
that it is produced socially, i.e., that its production involves the cooperation
of many individuals, and that these individuals enter into specific forms of
social relations in producing it.”3 Mindful of this, it is no stretch to claim
that an important benefit of universal service would be its ability to help
people appreciate these social relations. Greater involvement might lead to
greater understanding, and along the way, an enormous scientific and civic
payoff. Universal service would help reveal the connections between the
treatment that a patient receives and the treatment that the research subject
helped test. That is, educational programs associated with the system might
clarify the connection between even the common pharmaceutical and the
numerous investigations that led to its development, as well as the longitudinal and field studies that helped determine the prevalence of a given
disease in the community.
These educational goals would not be the primary justification for the
system of universal service; improving the quality of and access to health-

218

C.D. HERRERA

care would be the most important reasons for having such a system. But
the educational component would be a practical and moral prerequisite for
the system’s functioning. Patients are for the most part accustomed to not
serving in any capacity in medical research. For them, universal service
will be a hard-sell no matter how it is packaged. People will I think be
more accepting of a system if they understand how connected they are
to healthcare research. With the system up and running, the continued
education and citizen involvement could help refine healthcare and the
selection process that it would rely on. People might more readily accept
a direct, albeit temporary, role in research if they understood the benefits
that medical research provides, and how these benefits are often communal
and personal.
JUSTICE AND THE NEED TO RECONCILE EXPECTATIONS
A standard criticism of healthcare alleges that the risks and benefits of
research are distributed unfairly. It is doubtful that a system of universal
service could eliminate injustices of this kind. Universal participation
would probably not translate into universally fair allocation of benefit.
Frankly, I am not convinced that the concept of just, universal benefit is
a coherent one.4 Be that as it may, some people will naturally benefit more
than others in a universal system, and people will enjoy differing benefits
from the research on any one day. This is no drawback of a universal
system. The educational component of the system could raise awareness
of the risks and benefits of research. While disparities in access and application would persist, they would thus be better understood if only because
they would be more visible. Resolving at least some of the injustice could
then be more straightforward.
In particular, the system would stand a good chance of being able to
show people the extent of the benefits that they are already receiving,
and show them the amount of participation that is required for additional
benefit. A clearer understanding of such things is important, since people
are not likely to give up their vision of medical progress soon. Patients,
we hear, routinely expect medicine to provide what was only yesterday
considered miraculous.5 Why not put this vague public expectation to good
use? Expectations, where they could be elaborated and perhaps studied indepth, could provide a foundation not just for greater participation, but for
universal service. We can talk about the ways that unrealistic expectations
of medical progress are based on flawed and potentially dangerous beliefs
about medical science, and there are commentators who do a good job of
that.6 But we will in the end be talking about justice and participation too.
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There is a close tie between a person’s attitudes about progress and that
person’s belief in an entitlement to it. There is also an intimate connection
between attitudes about fair distribution of the risks and rewards associated
with attaining that progress.
Decades of debate over setting limits and reducing the demands placed
on healthcare systems don’t appear to have had much effect outside
the colloquia circuit and the bioethics bookshelf. The need for greater
involvement in research derives in part from a need to reconcile the often
unrealistic expectations that people have about healthcare (and their own
health) with the scientific and social reality of healthcare research. It is
as important for society to be clear on its expectations about research
and health matters as it is for society to know how these two are related.
According to an old saying, people in a democracy get the government they
deserve. The same might be said of people in a public healthcare system,
except that unlike government, it seems easier to see what one might
do to improve healthcare. Improving healthcare from within a system of
universal participation seems very possible, inasmuch as the educational
component of the system could show that the quality of medicine in society
is contingent on the results of medical research, and that this depends on
the level of public involvement.
Mention of the need for and benefits of involvement returns us to the
thought that knowledge about health is a public good. We needn’t concern
ourselves with the prospect that in some communities medical knowledge,
as a social commodity, will be valued higher than in other communities.
Nor would it be especially problematic if some communities take interest
in aspects of healthcare that another community willfully ignores. The
level of participation in the research system would ideally correspond to
the value that people in that community place on healthcare. In addition,
once we view health as a social product, it becomes less important whether
we feel that we benefit, as individuals, from medical research. The broader
view has us moving away from the individualistic thinking that encourages
us to care only whether we or those we know can remain healthy. A viable
system of universal service would be based on the idea that there is a social
good in living amongst those who are in fairly good health.
This is not a system that would force one to choose between liberalism
and communitarianism. Supposing that I could avoid illness, and only
occasionally rely directly on the medical system, I benefit nonetheless
from being around those who are not contagious. Your ability to remain
healthy can have a positive effect on me, and vice-versa. People interact
in many different common and intersecting zones, including the economy,
the government, and the educational system. Everyone benefits from the

220

C.D. HERRERA

health of others within each zone, just as everyone benefits, in theory, from
universal, compulsory education. The presumption is that society is better
served, in ways that might be impossible to delineate, from people having
a standard level of education and health. The relevant connections between
healthcare and research participation go beyond what one person owes
another in terms of direct sharing and benefit. If we assume that we want
to maintain this kind of shared, social benefit, the way is clear to explore
a system of universal service. That system should include an educational
component. A universal system should reflect our expectations and then
some. It should be responsive to those expectations and give stakeholders
a sense of engagement that they may lack under other systems.
Some commentators argue for a system based on one-to-one exchange
or reciprocity. Under that model, patients would mainly reap the benefits that they, not others, have sown. They would be responsible for
purchasing and providing for the level of care that they desire. Advocates of this individualistic approach usually offer it with the trimmings of
free-market capitalism. “In identified research settings,” one writer claims,
“the knowing beneficiaries of care incur an obligation to participate in
research.”7 Perhaps, but I am assuming that the allocation of benefits from
a healthcare-research system are far more subtle than this. A system that
has patients paying in what they expect to take out later only makes sense
where we can identify the direct connections between a research effort and
a clinical benefit. In most cases I suspect that this will be impossible. This
leaves me skeptical when I hear advice about hospital stays, for example,
that urge people to donate blood in the months before they undergo scheduled surgery. This presumptive ethic would elicit a degree of engagement
that is preferable to doing nothing at all. So too is an ethic that placed
a high value on “pure” volunteerism, that is, efforts to assist others that
were motivated by altruism alone. But how one could construct a system of
healthcare research along these lines, or more to the point, how the system
could function on a wide scale and over the long haul, is unclear. The cynic
in me wonders if the need for a compulsory system isn’t evidenced by the
lack of altruism in the first place. As for a system that relied on people
looking out for themselves, Adam Smith famously promoted an economic
stance based on self-interest, yet presupposed a ground-floor built from
universal benevolence and a feeling of community involvement.
Whatever reasoning we fall back on, it will have to bridge the usual
divide between the individual and the group. The positive influences that
altruism and self-interest might have on the amount and type of participation in a compulsory system can’t be denied, but these must be adapted
in light of the nature of healthcare, and the connectedness of public life.
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This connectedness weighs against our being able to expand something
like a reciprocal, individualistic model of healthcare research to everyone.
Not the least of the problems with the theory that a person can stockpile
blood or money for later use is that in many instances it is knowledge
that is in short supply, rather than resources or funds. (There are also
significant technical drawbacks: how would a person stockpile the necessary resources and supplies for psychiatric and similar treatment?) Rare is
the case where someone can know the extent of his or her health-related
benefits. Being able to know what you can obtain under an insurance plan
only scratches the surface. More useful would be knowledge of the number
of days you remain healthy and how much this can be attributed to your
standard of living, your diet, your neighbors, or some combination of these
and other factors.
In summary then, considerations of and beliefs about justice are central
to the plausibility of a universal system. Recommendations that people
anticipate their own surgery or those of a loved one are optimistic yet
short-sighted. It is easier to speak of trade-offs like this than it is to show
how they are supposed to work. Recommendations that people who receive
care for X incur a duty to serve in research on X are too limited. Linking
a particular benefit with a specific level of involvement in research is
going to be very difficult, regardless of the level of participation in the
system. A further risk is that the attempt to carve out individual spheres of
responsibility will reinforce the counter-productive idea of individualistic
medicine.
THE RANGE OF SERVICE
There might so far be an impression that when I speak of medical
research I mean medical experiments. Universal service would not result
in lines at the local hospital where selectees wait for their weekly stints
as research subjects. Research is much more than clinical trials. Research
in this context is as broad as the notion of healthcare. Healthcare, in turn,
“embraces everything from public health sewage treatment to neurosurgery, from physical therapy to cancer treatment, from medical technicians
to family practice.”8 Daniels argues convincingly that “healthcare needs
emerge as a broad and diverse set. Healthcare needs will be those things
we need in order to maintain, restore, or provide functional equivalents
(where possible) to normal species functioning.”9 He goes on to list a few
of the more important categories of needs, including adequate nutrition and
shelter, and “social support services.” This is I think the correct approach
to understanding the wide range of interests and needs that a healthcare
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system must respond to. When we neglect the ordinary, even mundane,
ways that people might serve in research, we limit the potential of medicine. The general intent behind a system of universal service would be to
benefit the entire healthcare network. “It is not,” Gilbert et al., point out,
“so much the direct payoff of this present [clinical] trial that we should
have our eye on, but pooled benefits of the whole system.”10 To this I
would add that universal service could seek to strengthen the moral and
scientific basis for running clinical trials as easily as it could improve the
system of evaluating and disseminating the results of a variety of research
projects.
This prospect shapes the possible forms of service in the system. I
presume that universal service would provide benefits for the selectees and
the public at large. The necessary level of benefits could accrue from one
person serving as a subject in a clinical trial. A similar level of benefit
might come from another person assisting in ethnographic research into
community health needs or even by serving in medical education and
training. Indeed, the objective would be to give those selected by a random
lottery a range of activities or procedures to choose from. Their options
would vary according to their health, age, financial status, and so on. As
such, participation would aim towards a compromise between individual
and community need. Participation would also accommodate the need for
both therapeutic and non-therapeutic research. Thus it might happen that
some people could benefit themselves the most from service in a clinical
trial, and that society could benefit from them playing this role, instead of,
for instance, providing tissue samples. This is especially so of patients who
can benefit most from treatments available only through research. People
with appropriate needs and interests could serve by sitting on the local
research-review board. They could care for laboratory animals, and even
enroll in training for a health-related field.
If I sound evasive when spelling out the specific things that people
might do under the guise of research participation, this is because I
believe it is crucial that the actual details of the system would be left to
local representatives of the system. That way, depending on community
interests, participants would be able to receive the forms of reward, such
as medical care for themselves or their dependents, that are valued highest
in that community. Overall, the system would function best and have the
strongest ethical backing if it were as representative as possible, and participation caused no substantial hardship for selectees.11 Potential benefits
would, in all cases, be balanced against burdens. A non-partisan review
board might try to ensure this. The members could be drawn from specialities and disciplines much as they are under ordinary healthcare-research
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systems. Board members could ensure that the research system reflects
community values, in much the same way that the use of random citizen
jurors is meant to ensure that the legal system reflects community values.12
As occurs in jury-selection systems, selectees for research service could
be compensated for meals, parking, and lost hours on the job. More to
the point, there could be within the system a graduated scale of financial
and other incentives for those who are willing to serve in highest-risk or
-demand areas.
RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND CONSCRIPTION
A critic might object that my proposal hinges on a spurious duty to help
others. The few positive duties that we do have, the critic might say,
rarely prescribe actions towards others, and no ethical theory dictates an
obligation to serve in public medicine.13 A system of universal participation would go against the grain in a society used to being able to
decline most forms of involvement. I can see where a proposal to establish a strict duty to serve could become ensnared in the political problems
associated with compulsory service. I can see why Marquis would warn
that universal service would lead to an “ethics of conscription.”14 Jonas
warns of a military-like conscription into healthcare during war or other
crises.15 And Fried worries that a universal service would trample the
rights of individuals who have no interest in serving.16 In a nutshell, the
conventional view holds that patients who suffer from HIV or a similar
headline-disease have few rights that they can invoke against me, such that
I have to provide something on their behalf. Proposals for universal service
in research usually fall on deaf ears in a libertarian society.
It is true that the parameters for a bona-fide duty to serve are murky.
An attempt to clarify a duty in the context of public medicine will raise
troubling questions about the nature and requirements of citizenship.
Nevertheless, these are questions that need to be raised. Entertaining the
idea of universal service provides for as good an excuse as any to do
that. Most of the concerns like those just mentioned apply only to a very
inelegant system of universal service. The research lottery could rely on
a random selection of adults. Selectees could receive notices to appear
for research service. This notice could explain that response is mandatory,
explain what the service will involve, and tell the selectee where to report.
The notice could also provide information about financial and other forms
of compensation for service, where this would be fitting. In theory, the
system could blindly draw citizens from across the socio-economic spectrum, with no regard for occupation or status. As children and the elderly

224

C.D. HERRERA

are consumers and beneficiaries of a public healthcare system, they too
could be selected. Proxies could determine the exact nature of the service
that the very young and old provide.
The universal system would not put an end to ethical dilemmas like
those surrounding surrogate consent and substituted judgment. But as
current systems do not eliminate ethical questions about consent and
manipulation, it is unfair to reject a competing system on these grounds.
The problem of proxy consent, or the participation of those who cannot
consent or decline for themselves is a fairly large one, and I don’t pretend
to address it substantively here. I do, nonetheless, tend to side with
commentators like McCormick, who begin by viewing health as a public
or social good, and from there reason that we can in select instances make
judgments about what those who are unable to evaluate their own roles
in research would consent to or decline.17 As McCormick points out, “as
social beings, our good, our flourishing (therefore our best interests) is
inextricably bound up with the well-being of others . . . Something can
be, therefore, in our best interests without we ourselves, precisely as isolated individuals, deriving any benefit or gain . . .”.18 The aim should be to
ensure that no one would be treated any worse under a universal system,
and this seems possible. The lottery system would make a pool of selectees
available only to reputable researchers and administrators (who might be
themselves serving) who can show adherence with institutional and legal
standards. No one would be asked to participate in research that held little
prospect for meaningful benefit, and there would be no chance of inductees
serving in commercial or cosmetic projects. Greater public involvement
might in fact ensure that medical research becomes more rigorous, and that
the criteria for determining research benefits would more closely reflect
public concerns.
I already suggested that one way to soften the blow on individual
autonomy would be to let lottery selectees choose a form of participation
that fits their needs and the community’s.19 A system of universal service
would also have to allow for exemptions. There would have to be a provision for those who were already receiving care for chronic disease, for
instance, to postpone service until they can better choose their method of
involvement. Where appropriate, people would be able to opt out of highrisk participation in favor of something like assisting in the recruitment of
patients for a study, or serving in some administrative capacity.
The system would still, for all intents, conscript people and possibly
impose community values onto them. Some people would prefer not to
serve, regardless of their expectations about the healthcare system. An
entire community might want nothing to do with medicine or science,
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because of beliefs about faith-healing, for example. How would autonomy
be preserved in such a scenario? First, all citizens could be made to understand that service is a mandatory part of citizenship, analogous to the duty
to pay taxes regardless of how much one uses public transportation and
utilities. There would be no arbitrary or surprise selections, but there would
also be no reasonable way to claim that one is wholly exempt, regardless of
wealth, prestige, or principle. Second, the system could allow for limited
expression of personal interest and priorities. The standard of informed
consent that applies to clinical research now would remain in place. Those
who do consent to serve in an experiment would of course be able to stop
participating at any time without penalty. Selectees would be able to count
on the same safeguards and oversight from ethics committees that they
do now. Where it would make sense to do so, citizens who serve in some
capacities would be compensated as they are now for service. If subjects
decided to decline participation or discontinue participation, they might,
depending on the length of their service, then be given a new list of options.
In these ways, the lottery would pose no threat to personal liberty or
fundamental beliefs that was not previously understood to be part of civic
duty. “Conscientious objectors” in this system would only have to report
to the selection authority and explain their reasons for wanting exemption from a certain form of participation. They could then be offered
less restrictive or intrusive forms of service, depending on the circumstances. The state would impose a duty to decide, not a duty to serve in a
specific way. Selectees would have to decide between serving or rejecting
a particular role in their own medical-research or healthcare system. The
provision for appeal and exemption from a particular form of service could
also accommodate the differences in the competency and qualifications of
selectees. This would be necessary where selectees are unable to evaluate
the terms of participation, as in the case of children or the incompetent.
Within such a system, some people would fail to exercise their own
autonomy, as they do under current systems. Citizens might not always
understand their rights, and they might feel compelled to serve in ways
that are against their wishes. But such risks are hardly unique to a system
of universal service, and the possibility of anything beyond subtle pressure
should underscore the corresponding need for education and public awareness regarding universal service. We are all potential patients who benefit
from the service that others give in research. As we have seen, we also
expect, and sometimes insist upon, medical progress. A universal system
would require that the aggregate serve according to the degree of progress
that it expects. While it would involve duties and obligations, this system
would be based on the prevailing expectations that people have about the
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accessibility and quality of medical care. I reiterate this point, since the
rationale behind the system would not be able to completely side-step
beliefs about what people are or are not entitled to. But it would focus
on what people are expecting from the system that they ultimately would
control.
The selection or recruitment component would ideally lead to greater
education about what participation would involve. In this way, the system
would minimize problems that the libertarian is concerned about, including
forced participation and infringing on personal interests. The goal would
be to help people see that the more they serve, the better positioned they
will be to adjust their expectations to the degree of their service. The
benefit of this type of service is that research would become more recognized as a public institution that draws upon the society whose values it
reflects. This would improve on most current systems, where patients who
are fortunate enough to afford it can pay thousands each year for insurance, spend weeks in a hospital complex the size of a small neighborhood,
and conclude the interaction by mailing a few completed forms. With
this detached, minimal-exposure form of treatment, the medical system
provides no mechanism for reflecting any expectations beyond the crudest
economic ones. A patient’s only real duty is to pay the bills. Patients who
can afford treatment have no incentive to hold their expectations up to
reality, much less community values. Patients who cannot afford healthcare may rightly view research as an individual burden, a last resort at
best.20 Worse still, these people may view healthcare as an entitlement to
be provided by others.
THE FREE RIDER
On that note, we have to consider a problem that confronts all conventional
healthcare systems. “Free-riders” knowingly benefit from the participation
of others in research, without giving any thought to participating themselves in some cases or in other cases under-participating. Free-riders thus
enjoy the rewards of medical research, aware all the while that others are
paying for those benefits. They exploit, in a very real sense, the queasiness that the majority has towards infringing on autonomy with the use
of conscription or penalties for not serving. It is hard to say what can be
done under any type of system when a portion of society is willing to take
advantage of the efforts that the rest are making. Responding to the freerider problem seems easier if a universal system is in place, however. That
kind of system could include penalties for those who fail to serve, or those
who repeatedly decline participation in high-demand areas. The penalties
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could include higher insurance premiums or similar means. Administrators
might also approach the problem in terms of offering rewards and incentives to those who do participate rather than punishing the free-riders who
don’t.
This would avoid the obvious course of denying healthcare benefits to
those who refuse to serve in good faith. I don’t think that there is a strong
moral basis for denial of benefit to would-be free-riders. We have already
discussed the difficulty in knowing when and how a particular medical
benefit is distributed, enjoyed, and even denied. This means that we can’t
always be sure what it is that the free-rider is getting away with. Steps can
nonetheless be taken in the direction of limiting access. Those steps can be
kept consistent with the principles behind the system of universal service.
Free-riders could be refused newly tested medications, or access to the best
teaching hospitals. Access to these could be made more available for those
with the highest level of service. A differential arrangement like this would
reduce the need for those who do participate in the system to compensate
for the effect of insufficient participation in some areas.
This isn’t the last word on achieving full and fair participation. Still, the
potential for free-riders should be regarded as yet another problem that the
public-education component of the universal system could tackle. (Critics
should in fairness not lose sight of the fact that free-riders are hardly
noticed under current systems of research.)21 Again, the random, periodic
mailing of a service notice might help instill in each citizen an awareness of
the importance of participation. The notice might educate recipients about
the communal nature of medicine and healthcare. Selectees uninterested in
serving in one capacity would be forced to explicitly decline participation,
with the knowledge that others are possibly serving. This could give an
impression of franchise, where each has the opportunity to participate, and
has equal claim to direct the course of research.
THE THREAT OF A SCIENTIZED SOCIETY
Finally, some might fear a slippery-slope. What if members of a community conclude that the duty to serve in research is based not on the
value of health per se, but on the general value of knowledge? They might
conclude that with different forms of research providing for a variety of
knowledge that pertains in some way to health, the lottery system should
extend to, say, service in psychological experiments or fieldwork that can
gather knowledge related to health. Would this lead to people serving in
ethnographic research or tabulating the findings from a survey of healthcare trends? It could, if the people represented were sufficiently concerned
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that some of this research should play a role in the quality and delivery of
their healthcare. In other words, fears that universal service would involve
participation outside of the norm, that selectees might have to fill out a
questionnaire instead of report to a hospital complex, reflect once more
a very narrow conception of medicine and medical science. The practice and development of medicine has always relied on inter-disciplinary
research. While everyone has an interest in maintaining a representative,
solid healthcare system, what constitutes such a system could be left to
public, community discretion.
The system would be a participatory, representative one to the degree
that the response and interest of the potential selectees would partly shape
public healthcare. If, to take one example, knowledge from sociologists
is deemed crucial to the level of progress that people expect in medicine,
then participation or other forms of support for sociologists would have to
increase. Because selectees would choose from a range of involvement
in research, they could participate in research that is not traditionally
thought of as clinical. It is hard to see how having more people determining what counts as a research benefit in healthcare would be anything
but an improvement. As I mentioned earlier, closer public involvement
might ensure that social science, and other forms of research that supplement traditional medical research, remain methodogically robust. Whether
a community would embrace the recognition of its own dependence on
science is another matter, one that can’t be settled in the abstract.
Before growing too concerned that universal service will create a
scientized society, we must ask if in some respects we don’t already dwell
in that society. Various disciplines and institutions converge from a number
of routes, and in their own ways, to develop and deliver the healthcare
we so often take for granted. In that light, the pressing danger might be
that we will continue to regard science in all its forms as far removed
from ordinary healthcare concerns, and continue to regard progress as the
responsibility of others. Pervasive involvement in medical research will
generate a new round of problems. But that same high level of citizen
involvement might help people who want to pool their efforts to resolve
those issues. A system centered on universal participation can help people
deal with pressing concerns, including insufficient involvement in research
and the problem of too much involvement, if that arises.
I want to close on that thought. A natural criticism of universal service
would allege that by, in effect, forcing citizens to care for each other, the
system of universal service might undermine the very important social
good of generosity, or what Walzer calls the social institution of the “gift.”
Walzer contends that
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bureaucracy is unavoidable given the size of contemporary political communities and
the range of necessary services. But the stark dualism of professional caretakers and
helpless wards can pose radical dangers for democratic government unless it is mediated by volunteers, organizers, representatives of the poor and the old, local friends and
neighbors.22

No society can afford to do without the “gift” institution for very long;
what amounts to forced gift-giving is as contradictory in terms as it is,
I imagine, unreliable in practice. Still, I do not share Walzer’s faith in
the average person’s sense of obligation, in the absence of some form of
government coercion. To think that we can depend on “local friends” to
play anything more than a symbolic (though admittedly important) function within a large healthcare-research system seems naive. Fortunately,
there is room to remain hopeful, since the underlying point is well-taken.
Formal, bureaucratic programs cannot hope to replace the sensitivity and
genuineness of one person voluntarily serving in research for another’s
benefit. The safe course for now is to take steps towards increasing awareness of how much volunteerism is needed, even in a system that is for
the most part compulsory. Should after a few years the administrators
of the universal system find that citizens do in fact feel a stronger than
expected interest in participating voluntarily, and not just for self-interest,
I am confident that there would be no tears shed as the compulsory system
was dismantled. The universal system might operate as an interim solution
only. Devising such a system is a preferable approach to waiting for the
anticipated surge of personal virtue in the name of research participation.

NOTES
1 Capron AM. Legal considerations affecting clinical pharmacological studies in children.
Clinical Research 1973; 21: 141–150.
2 Smith P. Liberalism and Affirmative Obligations. NY: Oxford University Press, 1998.
3 Wartofsky MW. Medical knowledge as a social product: Rights, risks, and responsibilities. In: Bondeson WB, Englehardt HT, Spicker SF, White JM, eds. New Knowledge in
the Biomedical Sciences: Some Moral Implications of Its Acquisition Possession and Use.
Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1982: 113–130.
4 Temkin LS. Justice and equality: Some questions about scope. In: Paul EF, Miller FD,
Paul J, eds. The Just Society. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995: 72–104.
5 Green RM. Justice and the claims of future generations. In: Shelp EE, ed. Justice and
Health Care. Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1981: 193–211.
6 Lantos JD. Do We Still Need Doctors? NY: Routledge, 1997.
7 Caplan A. If I Were a Rich Man, Could I Buy a Pancreas? Bloomington, IL: Indiana
University Press, 1992.
8 Thomasma DC. The goals of medicine and society. In: Brock DH, ed. The Culture of
Biomedicine. Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1984: 34–54.
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9 Daniels N. Just Health Care. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
10 Gilbert JP, McPeek B, Mosteller F. Statistics and ethics in surgery and anesthesia.

Science 1977; 198: 684–689.
11 Singer thinks that we have a similar duty to aid others. In brief, he claims that a person is
obligated to help another if, among other criteria, helping does not call for a morally significant amount of sacrifice. Singer P. Practical Ethics. NY: Cambridge University Press,
1979.
12 Abramson J. Juries and local justice. In: Sarat A, Villa DR, eds. Liberal Modernism
and Democratic Individuality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996: 265–306.
13 On the difficulty of combining rights claims with access to medical care, see
Buchanan AE. Rights, obligations, and the special importance of health care. In: Bole TJ,
Bondeson WB, eds. Rights to Health Care. Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1991: 169–184.
14 Marquis D. Leaving therapy to chance. Hastings Center Report 1983; 13: 40–47.
15 Jonas H. Philosophical reflections on experimenting with human subjects. In: Freund
PA, ed. Experimentation with Human Subjects. NY: George Braziller, 1970: 1–31.
16 Fried C. Medical Experimentation: Personal Integrity and Social Policy. NY: Elsevier
Publishing, 1974.
17 McCormick RA. How Brave a New World? NY: Doubleday, 1981.
18 McCormick, cited in note 17 above, p. 101.
19 This would give the system the needed flexibility to respond to changes in public
healthcare needs, as many communities now are still unable to respond to epidemics like
AIDS or medical emergencies like bio-terrorism scares.
20 For a survey of the problems that the recruitment of the disadvantaged raises, see
Vere D. Volunteers: The susceptible and the disadvantaged. In: Close B, Combes R,
Hubbard A, Illingworth J, eds. Volunteers in Research and Testing. London: Taylor &
Francis, 1997: 67–87.
21 Harris makes a similar point regarding his “Survival Lottery”. In one version of his
thought-experiment, we imagine a planet where a lottery routinely selects random individuals to give up their lives (and organs) so that a greater number of people might receive
them in transplant. This, Harris speculates, would usually lead to one person giving up a
life for the sake of at least two others. Although Harris grants that such a world would
challenge our moral intuitions, he forces one to explain why a system of full volunteerism,
which leaves patients to die for lack of organs, is any better. Harris J. The survival lottery.
Philosophy 1975; 50: 81–87.
22 Walzer M. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. NY: Basic Books,
1983.
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